feat: breaking change (unstable) (#198)

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #175

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryption.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #177

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryptio.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #178

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #179

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #180

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #181

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #182

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #183

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #184

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #185

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #186

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #187

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 14. Secure Multiparty Computation.md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/Lecture Notes/Modern Cryptography/2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryption.md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #188

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 14. Secure Multiparty Computation.md

* DELETE FILE : _posts/Lecture Notes/Modern Cryptography/2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryption.md

* chore: remove files

* [PUBLISHER] upload files #197

* PUSH NOTE : 수학 공부에 대한 고찰.md

* PUSH NOTE : 09. Lp Functions.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-09.png

* PUSH NOTE : 08. Comparison with the Riemann Integral.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-08.png

* PUSH NOTE : 04. Measurable Functions.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-04.png

* PUSH NOTE : 06. Convergence Theorems.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-06.png

* PUSH NOTE : 07. Dominated Convergence Theorem.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-07.png

* PUSH NOTE : 05. Lebesgue Integration.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-05.png

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Measure Spaces.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-03.png

* PUSH NOTE : 02. Construction of Measure.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-02.png

* PUSH NOTE : 01. Algebra of Sets and Set Functions.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mt-01.png

* PUSH NOTE : Rules of Inference with Coq.md

* PUSH NOTE : 블로그 이주 이야기.md

* PUSH NOTE : Secure IAM on AWS with Multi-Account Strategy.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : separation-by-product.png

* PUSH NOTE : You and Your Research, Richard Hamming.md

* PUSH NOTE : 10. Digital Signatures.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-10-dsig-security.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-10-schnorr-identification.png

* PUSH NOTE : 9. Public Key Encryption.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-09-ss-pke.png

* PUSH NOTE : 8. Number Theory.md

* PUSH NOTE : 7. Key Exchange.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-07-dhke.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-07-dhke-mitm.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-07-merkle-puzzles.png

* PUSH NOTE : 6. Hash Functions.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-06-merkle-damgard.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-06-davies-meyer.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-06-hmac.png

* PUSH NOTE : 5. CCA-Security and Authenticated Encryption.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-05-ci.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-05-etm-mte.png

* PUSH NOTE : 1. OTP, Stream Ciphers and PRGs.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-01-prg-game.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-01-ss.png

* PUSH NOTE : 4. Message Authentication Codes.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-04-mac.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-04-mac-security.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-04-cbc-mac.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-04-ecbc-mac.png

* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-ecb-encryption.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-cbc-encryption.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-ctr-encryption.png

* PUSH NOTE : 2. PRFs, PRPs and Block Ciphers.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-block-cipher.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-feistel-network.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-des-round.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-DES.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-aes-128.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-02-2des-mitm.png

* PUSH NOTE : 18. Bootstrapping & CKKS.md

* PUSH NOTE : 17. BGV Scheme.md

* PUSH NOTE : 16. The GMW Protocol.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-16-beaver-triple.png

* PUSH NOTE : 15. Garbled Circuits.md

* PUSH NOTE : 14. Secure Multiparty Computation.md

* PUSH NOTE : 13. Sigma Protocols.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-13-sigma-protocol.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-13-okamoto.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-13-chaum-pedersen.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-13-gq-protocol.png

* PUSH NOTE : 12. Zero-Knowledge Proofs (Introduction).md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-12-id-protocol.png

* PUSH NOTE : 11. Advanced Topics.md

* PUSH NOTE : 0. Introduction.md

* PUSH NOTE : 02. Symmetric Key Cryptography (1).md

* PUSH NOTE : 09. Transport Layer Security.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-09-tls-handshake.png

* PUSH NOTE : 08. Public Key Infrastructure.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-08-certificate-validation.png

* PUSH NOTE : 07. Public Key Cryptography.md

* PUSH NOTE : 06. RSA and ElGamal Encryption.md

* PUSH NOTE : 05. Modular Arithmetic (2).md

* PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-feistel-function.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-cfb-encryption.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-03-ofb-encryption.png

* PUSH NOTE : 04. Modular Arithmetic (1).md

* PUSH NOTE : 01. Security Introduction.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : is-01-cryptosystem.png

* PUSH NOTE : Search Time in Hash Tables.md

* PUSH NOTE : 랜덤 PS일지 (1).md

* chore: rearrange articles

* feat: fix paths

* feat: fix all broken links

* feat: title font to palatino

_posts/lecture-notes/internet-security/2023-10-18-tls.md

@@ -74,42 +74,42 @@ To defend this attack, we can use [encrypt-then-MAC (Modern Cryptography)](../..
 
 We will perform a **chosen ciphertext attack** to fully recover the plaintext.
 
-Suppose that we obtain a ciphertext $(\mathrm{IV}, c_1, c_2)$, which is an encryption of two blocks $m = m_0 \parallel m_1$, including the padding. By the CBC encryption algorithm we know that
+Suppose that we obtain a ciphertext $(\mathrm{IV}, c _ 1, c _ 2)$, which is an encryption of two blocks $m = m _ 0 \parallel m _ 1$, including the padding. By the CBC encryption algorithm we know that
 
 $$
-c_1 = E_k(m_0 \oplus \mathrm{IV}), \qquad c_2 = E_k(m_1 \oplus c_1).
+c _ 1 = E _ k(m _ 0 \oplus \mathrm{IV}), \qquad c _ 2 = E _ k(m _ 1 \oplus c _ 1).
 $$
 
-We don't know exactly how many padding bits there were, but it doesn't matter. We brute force by **changing the last byte of $c_1$** and requesting the decryption of the modified ciphertext $(\mathrm{IV}, c_1', c_2)$.
+We don't know exactly how many padding bits there were, but it doesn't matter. We brute force by **changing the last byte of $c _ 1$** and requesting the decryption of the modified ciphertext $(\mathrm{IV}, c _ 1', c _ 2)$.
 
-The decryption process of the last block is $c_1 \oplus D_k(c_2)$, so by changing the last byte of $c_1$, we hope to get a decryption result that ends with $\texttt{0x01}$. Then the last byte $\texttt{0x01}$ will be treated as a padding and padding errors will not occur. So we keep trying until we don't get a padding error.[^1]
+The decryption process of the last block is $c _ 1 \oplus D _ k(c _ 2)$, so by changing the last byte of $c _ 1$, we hope to get a decryption result that ends with $\texttt{0x01}$. Then the last byte $\texttt{0x01}$ will be treated as a padding and padding errors will not occur. So we keep trying until we don't get a padding error.[^1]
 
-Now, suppose that we successfully changed the last byte of $c_1$ to $b$, so that the last byte of $(c_1[0\dots6] \parallel b) \oplus D_k(c_2)$ is $\texttt{0x01}$. Next, we change the second-last bit $c_1[6]$ and request the decryption and hope to get an output that ends with $\texttt{0x0202}$. The last two bytes will also be treated as a padding and we won't get a padding error.
+Now, suppose that we successfully changed the last byte of $c _ 1$ to $b$, so that the last byte of $(c _ 1[0\dots6] \parallel b) \oplus D _ k(c _ 2)$ is $\texttt{0x01}$. Next, we change the second-last bit $c _ 1[6]$ and request the decryption and hope to get an output that ends with $\texttt{0x0202}$. The last two bytes will also be treated as a padding and we won't get a padding error.
 
-We repeat the above process until we get a modified ciphertext $c_1' \parallel c_2$, where the decryption result ends with $8$ bytes of $\texttt{0x08}$. Then now we know that
+We repeat the above process until we get a modified ciphertext $c _ 1' \parallel c _ 2$, where the decryption result ends with $8$ bytes of $\texttt{0x08}$. Then now we know that
 
 $$
-c_1' \oplus D_k(c_2) = \texttt{0x08}^8.
+c _ 1' \oplus D _ k(c _ 2) = \texttt{0x08}^8.
 $$
 
-Then we can recover $D_k(c_2) = c_1' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8$, and then since $m_1 = c_1 \oplus D_k(c_2)$,
+Then we can recover $D _ k(c _ 2) = c _ 1' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8$, and then since $m _ 1 = c _ 1 \oplus D _ k(c _ 2)$,
 
 $$
-m_1 = c_1 \oplus D_k(c_2) = c_1 \oplus c_1' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8,
+m _ 1 = c _ 1 \oplus D _ k(c _ 2) = c _ 1 \oplus c _ 1' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8,
 $$
 
-allowing us to recover the whole message $m_1$.
+allowing us to recover the whole message $m _ 1$.
 
-Now to recover $m_0$, we modify the $\mathrm{IV}$ using the same method as above. This time, we do not use $c_2$ and request a decryption of $(\mathrm{IV}', c_1)$ only. If some $\mathrm{IV}'$ gives a decryption result that ends with $8$ bytes of $\texttt{0x08}$, we have that
+Now to recover $m _ 0$, we modify the $\mathrm{IV}$ using the same method as above. This time, we do not use $c _ 2$ and request a decryption of $(\mathrm{IV}', c _ 1)$ only. If some $\mathrm{IV}'$ gives a decryption result that ends with $8$ bytes of $\texttt{0x08}$, we have that
 
 $$
-\mathrm{IV}' \oplus D_k(c_1) = \texttt{0x08}^8.
+\mathrm{IV}' \oplus D _ k(c _ 1) = \texttt{0x08}^8.
 $$
 
-Similarly, we recover $m_0$ by
+Similarly, we recover $m _ 0$ by
 
 $$
-m_0 = \mathrm{IV} \oplus D_k(c_1) = \mathrm{IV} \oplus \mathrm{IV}' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8.
+m _ 0 = \mathrm{IV} \oplus D _ k(c _ 1) = \mathrm{IV} \oplus \mathrm{IV}' \oplus \texttt{0x08}^8.
 $$
 
 ## Hashed MAC (HMAC)
@@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ Let $H$ be a has function. We defined MAC as $H(k \parallel m)$ where $k$ is a k
 Choose a key $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, and set
 
 $$
-k_1 = k \oplus \texttt{ipad}, \quad k_2 = k\oplus \texttt{opad}
+k _ 1 = k \oplus \texttt{ipad}, \quad k _ 2 = k\oplus \texttt{opad}
 $$
 
 where $\texttt{ipad} = \texttt{0x363636}...$ and $\texttt{opad} = \texttt{0x5C5C5C}...$. Then
 
 $$
-\mathrm{HMAC}(k, m) = H(k_2 \parallel H(k_1 \parallel m)).
+\mathrm{HMAC}(k, m) = H(k _ 2 \parallel H(k _ 1 \parallel m)).
 $$
 
 ## TLS Details
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Here's how the client and the server establishes a connection using the TLS hand
 
 - Client sends the TLS protocol version and cipher suites that it supports.
 	- The version is the highest version supported by the client.
-- A random number $N_c$ for generating the secret is sent.
+- A random number $N _ c$ for generating the secret is sent.
 - A session ID may be sent if the client wants to resume an old session.
 
 #### ServerHello
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Here's how the client and the server establishes a connection using the TLS hand
 - Server sends the TLS version and cipher suite to use.
 	- The TLS version will be the highest version supported by both parties.
 	- The server will pick the strongest cryptographic algorithm offered by the client.
-- The server also sends a random number $N_s$.
+- The server also sends a random number $N _ s$.
 
 #### Certificate/ServerKeyExchange
 
@@ -177,10 +177,10 @@ Here's how the client and the server establishes a connection using the TLS hand
 
 #### ClientKeyExchange
 
-- Client sends *premaster secret* (PMS) $secret_c$.
+- Client sends *premaster secret* (PMS) $secret _ c$.
 	- This is encrypted with server's public key.
 	- This secret key material will be used to generate the secret key.
-- Both parties derive a shared **session key** from $N_c$, $N_s$, $secret_c$.
+- Both parties derive a shared **session key** from $N _ c$, $N _ s$, $secret _ c$.
 	- If the protocol is correct, the same key should be generated.
 
 #### Finished