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* PUSH NOTE : 3. Symmetric Key Encryption.md * PUSH NOTE : 03. Symmetric Key Cryptography (2).md * DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-18-symmetric-key-cryptography-2.md
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title: 3. Symmetric Key Encryption
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title: 3. Symmetric Key Encryption
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date: 2023-09-19
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date: 2023-09-19
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github_title: 2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryption
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github_title: 2023-09-19-symmetric-key-encryption
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attachment:
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folder: assets/img/posts/lecture-notes/internet-security
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---
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---
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## CPA Security
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## CPA Security
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### Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
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### Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
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- ECB mode encrypts each block with the same key.
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- ECB mode encrypts each block with the same key.
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- Blocks are independent of each other.
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- Blocks are independent of each other.
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### Ciphertext Block Chain Mode (CBC)
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### Ciphertext Block Chain Mode (CBC)
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Let $X = \left\lbrace 0, 1 \right\rbrace^n$ and $E : \mathcal{K} \times X \rightarrow X$ be a **PRP**.
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Let $X = \left\lbrace 0, 1 \right\rbrace^n$ and $E : \mathcal{K} \times X \rightarrow X$ be a **PRP**.
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> m_0' = \mathrm{IV}_2 \oplus \mathrm{IV}_0 \oplus m_0, \quad m_1' = \mathrm{IV}_2 \oplus \mathrm{IV}_1 \oplus m_1
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> m_0' = \mathrm{IV}_2 \oplus \mathrm{IV}_0 \oplus m_0, \quad m_1' = \mathrm{IV}_2 \oplus \mathrm{IV}_1 \oplus m_1
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> $$
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> $$
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>
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>
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> and send it to the challenger.
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> and send it to the challenger.
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> 4. In experiment $b$, the adversary will receive $E(k, \mathrm{IV}_b \oplus m_b)$. Compare this with the result of the query from (2). The adversary wins with advantage $1$.
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> 4. In experiment $b$, the adversary will receive $E(k, \mathrm{IV}_b \oplus m_b)$. Compare this with the result of the query from (2). The adversary wins with advantage $1$.
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(More on this to be added)
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(More on this to be added)
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### Counter Mode (CTR)
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### Counter Mode (CTR)
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Let $F : \mathcal{K} \times X \rightarrow X$ be a secure **PRF**.
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Let $F : \mathcal{K} \times X \rightarrow X$ be a secure **PRF**.
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