calofmijuck/blog
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/calofmijuck/blog.git synced 2025-12-06 22:53:51 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

fix: broken image links have been fixed

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Sungchan Yi
2024-02-09 14:25:14 +09:00
parent 07a5d77dae
commit 43e468b600
44 changed files with 73 additions and 73 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
_posts/Lecture Notes/Modern Cryptography/2023-10-26-digital-signatures.md
View File

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ $$
The definition is similar to the [secure MAC](../2023-09-21-macs/#secure-mac-unforgeability). The adversary can perform a **chosen message attack**, but cannot create an **existential forgery**.
![mc-10-dsig-security.png](../../../assets/img/posts/Lecture%20Notes/Modern%20Cryptography/mc-10-dsig-security.png)
![mc-10-dsig-security.png](/assets/img/posts/Lecture%20Notes/Modern%20Cryptography/mc-10-dsig-security.png)
> **Definition.** Let $\mc{S} = (G, S, V)$ be a signature scheme defined over $(\mc{M}, \Sigma)$. Given an adversary $\mc{A}$, the game goes as follows.
>
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ This scheme is originally from the **Schnorr identification protocol**.
Let $G = \left\langle g \right\rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order $q$. We consider an interaction between two parties, prover $P$ and a verifier $V$. The prover has a secret $\alpha \in \Z_q$ and the verification key is $u = g^\alpha$. **$P$ wants to convince $V$ that he knows $\alpha$, but does not want to reveal $\alpha$**.
![mc-10-schnorr-identification.png](../../../assets/img/posts/Lecture%20Notes/Modern%20Cryptography/mc-10-schnorr-identification.png)
![mc-10-schnorr-identification.png](/assets/img/posts/Lecture%20Notes/Modern%20Cryptography/mc-10-schnorr-identification.png)
The protocol $\mc{I}_\rm{sch} = (G, P, V)$ works as follows.