[PUBLISHER] upload files #162

* PUSH NOTE : 1. OTP, Stream Ciphers and PRGs.md

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-01-prg-game.png

* PUSH ATTACHMENT : mc-01-ss.png

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs/mc-01-prg-game.png

* DELETE FILE : _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs/mc-01-ss.png

_posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs.md

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ tags:
 title: 1. One-Time Pad, Stream Ciphers and PRGs
 date: 2023-09-07
 github_title: 2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs
-image:
-  path: _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs/mc-01-ss.png
-attachment:
-  folder: _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs
 path: _posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/2023-09-07-otp-stream-cipher-prgs
+image:
+  path: assets/img/posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/mc-01-ss.png
+attachment:
+  folder: assets/img/posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography
 ---
 
 ## Assumptions and Notations
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ We can deduce that if a PRG is predictable, then it is insecure.
 
 *Proof*. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an efficient adversary (next bit predictor) that predicts $G$. Suppose that $i$ is the index chosen by $\mathcal{A}$. With $\mathcal{A}$, we construct a statistical test $\mathcal{B}$ such that $\mathrm{Adv}_\mathrm{PRG}[\mathcal{B}, G]$ is non-negligible.
 
-![mc-01-prg-game.png](./mc-01-prg-game.png)
+![mc-01-prg-game.png](../../../../assets/img/posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/mc-01-prg-game.png)
 
 1. The challenger PRG will send a bit string $x$ to $\mathcal{B}$.
 	- In experiment $0$, PRG gives pseudorandom string $G(k)$.
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ The theorem implies that if next bit predictors cannot distinguish $G$ from true
 
 To motivate the definition of semantic security, we consider a **security game framework** (attack game) between a **challenger** (ex. the creator of some cryptographic scheme) and an **adversary** $\mathcal{A}$ (ex. attacker of the scheme).
 
-![mc-01-ss.png](./mc-01-ss.png)
+![mc-01-ss.png](../../../../assets/img/posts/lecture-notes/modern-cryptography/mc-01-ss.png)
 
 > **Definition.** Let $\mathcal{E} = (G, E, D)$ be a cipher defined over $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$. For a given adversary $\mathcal{A}$, we define two experiments $0$ and $1$. For $b \in \lbrace 0, 1 \rbrace$, define experiment $b$ as follows:
 >